Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy Controls by Tucker, Catherine Elizabeth
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694319 




∗Catherine Tucker, MIT Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, MA; 617 252-1499 and NBER;
cetucker@MIT.EDU. I thank the Time Warner Cable Research Program on Digital Communications and the Net In-
stitute for financial support. This research was also financially supported by NSF CAREER Award No. 6923256 I also
thank Alessandro Acquisti, Emilio Calvano, Avi Goldfarb, Garrett Johnson, Cait Lambert, Alex Marthews, Markus
Mobius, Martin Peitz, Ken Wilbur and seminar participants at the AEA meetings, Dartmouth, Harvard, the NBER, the
National University of Singapore, New York University, the University of Florida, the University of Mannheim and
the University of Munich. All mistakes are mine alone.
1
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694319 
Social Networks, Personalized Advertising and Privacy
Controls
Abstract
This paper investigates how internet users’ perception of control over their personal in-
formation affects how likely they are to click on online advertising on a social networking
website. The paper uses data from a randomized field experiment that examined the effec-
tiveness of personalizing ad text with user-posted personal information relative to generic text.
The website gave users more control over their personally identifiable information in the mid-
dle of the field test. However, the website did not change how advertisers used data to target
and personalize ads. Before the policy change, personalized ads did not perform particularly
well. However, after this enhancement of perceived control over privacy, users were nearly
twice as likely to click on personalized ads. Ads that targeted but did not use personalized
text remained unchanged in effectiveness. The increase in effectiveness was larger for ads that
used more unique private information to personalize their message and for target groups who
were more likely to use opt-out privacy settings.
Keywords: Privacy, Online Advertising, Social Networks
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Many Internet firms have collected a huge amount of personal data from their users and use
this data to allow their advertisers to target and personalize ads. Consumers might see personalized
ad content on such sites as more appealing and more connected to their interests [2, 22], but they
also may see it as ‘not only creepy, but off-putting’ if they feel that the firm has violated their
privacy [36]. These privacy concerns may lead to ‘reactance’ which leads consumers to resist the
ad’s appeal [43]. ‘Reactance’ is a motivational state when consumers resist something they find
coercive by behaving in the opposite way to the one intended [8, 11, 9].
Internet firms are unsure about whether they should directly address such concerns by strength-
ening privacy controls. Theoretically, this could minimize the potential for customer reactance and
improve the performance of online advertising, because behavioral research shows that consumer
perceptions of control reduce reactance [37]. This holds even if the controls are only tangentially
related to the area where reactance may be invoked [32, 38]. For example, cancer patients are more
likely to comply with restrictive treatment regimes if they are given perceived control over another
aspect of their medical care. However, there is the risk that addressing consumer privacy concerns
but continuing to use consumer data to personalize ads may make users less likely to respond to
such ads. This ambiguity makes it an empirical question as to how strengthening privacy controls
affects advertising performance.
I explore this question using data from a randomized field experiment conducted by a US-based
nonprofit to optimize its advertising campaigns on Facebook, a social networking website. These
campaigns were shown to 1.2 million Facebook users. The nonprofit’s aim was to raise awareness
of its work improving education for women in East Africa. The nonprofit randomized whether
it explicitly personalized the ad copy to match data from the user’s profile. In one condition,
consumers saw ads that, for example, explicitly mentioned a celebrity that was featured in their
Facebook profile. In other conditions they just saw generic text.
In the middle of the field experiment, in response to mounting media criticism, Facebook
changed their privacy policies. The policy change introduced an easy-to-use privacy control in-
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terface, reduced the amount of information that was automatically required to be displayed, and
also gave users new controls over how their personally identifiable data could be tracked or used
by third parties. This change did not, however, affect the underlying algorithm by which advertis-
ing was displayed, targeted and personalized, since the advertising platform used anonymous data.
So, before and after the policy change, advertisers could still choose to target ads towards Oprah
Winfrey fans, and personalize the advertising message to mention ‘Oprah Winfrey,’ in exactly the
same manner as they did before. What changed was simply how easy it was for users to control
access to their information by regular Facebook users.
The nonprofit had not anticipated there would be such a change when it launched its field test
of its ads. However, the fact that this occurred mid-way through the field experiment is valuable
for measuring the effect of a firm responding to privacy concerns by improving privacy controls on
advertising effectiveness, while circumventing the usual endogeneity issues.
This paper’s analysis spans five weeks of campaign-level click-through data that falls either side
of the introduction of the new privacy controls. It finds that personalized advertising, surprisingly,
was relatively ineffective before Facebook introduced new privacy controls. However, personalized
advertising was nearly twice as effective at attracting users to the nonprofit’s Facebook page after
the shift in Facebook policy that gave users more control over their personal information. There
was no significant change in the effectiveness of advertising that was shown to the same people
but used a generic message over the period. This is to be expected, because such ads do not make
clear to consumers whether their private information is being used to target.
This interpretation rests on the assumption that there were no underlying changes in user be-
havior or the environment that coincided with the introduction of the new privacy controls but were
not directly attributable to the introduction of these controls. There was no significant change in the
ads shown, the user composition of Facebook, use of the website, or advertiser behavior during the
period studied. There was also no change in how likely people were to sign up for the nonprofit’s
news feed after clicking on the ad, suggesting that the result is not an artifact of curiosity. Another
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concern is that there was a lot of publicity around the policy change, so the analysis deploys many
different controls for media coverage.
Building on existing research that documents that ‘reactance’ to personalized advertising is
greatest when the information used is more unique [43], the paper then explores whether the pos-
itive effect of improved privacy controls was greatest for ads that used more unique information.
Though some celebrities in the data, like Oprah Winfrey, have as many as two million fans on Face-
book, some of the celebrities or undergraduate institutions were unusual enough that their potential
reach was only in the thousands. Personalization was relatively more effective for personalized ads
that used unusual information after privacy controls were enhanced. This provides evidence that
consumers were concerned that the information being used in the ads was simply too personal to
be used in an ad without a corresponding sense of control over their data.
The analysis then explores whether the measured effect depends on the extent to which con-
sumers use privacy settings on Facebook. This is empirically ambiguous. On the one hand, con-
sumers who care about privacy and use privacy settings may be more upset if they set high lev-
els of privacy restrictions and still see highly personalized advertising. On the other hand, such
consumers who are more aware of privacy matters on Facebook may have experienced the most
reactance prior to Facebook addressing privacy complaints with the improved set of privacy poli-
cies. They may have also been the most reassured that they could now explicitly prevent Facebook
from sharing their click data with third parties. Further analysis suggests that the measured effect
is larger for groups of consumers who used privacy controls to restrict the ability of another ad
product to use their data. This also provides evidence that the measured effect is associated with
tastes for privacy controls rather than other external factors.
0.1 Contribution
These findings contribute at four levels.
First, to the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper that uses field data to study the con-
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sequences for advertising outcomes of a firm responding to user privacy concerns by introducing
improved privacy controls. (author?) [42] found that 66 percent of Americans do not want mar-
keters to tailor advertisements to their interests. Fear of such resistance has led advertisers to limit
their tailoring of ads [24]. The finding that there are positive effects for an advertising platform, in
this instance, from addressing users’ privacy concerns is therefore useful.
Second, these findings have implications for privacy regulation. Currently, proposed regula-
tions such as ‘Do Not Track’ governing online behavioral advertising in the US are focused around
the mechanics of how websites implement opt-in and opt-out use of cookies and other tracking
devices. Previous empirical research suggests that this approach, by limiting the use of data by
firms, reduces ad effectiveness ((author?) [19, 40]). By contrast, the results in this paper show
that in this setting, when a social networking website allowed customers to choose how personally
identifiable information about them was shared and used, there was no negative effect on advertis-
ing performance. This is an important finding for policymakers deciding on whether to emphasize
user-based controls in privacy regulation both in the US and elsewhere.
On the academic side, this paper builds on research that has focused on more general questions
of the role of control in mediating privacy concerns. Early research on privacy tended to simply
describe privacy as a matter of giving users control over their data [30]. However, more recent
research in information systems has challenged this and has shown how individual-level control
can mediate privacy concerns [16, 12, 25].1 This remains the case even if the control is merely
perceptual or over tangential information, and access to the focal data remains unchanged [35, 44,
7, 45]. The contribution of the paper to this literature is to demonstrate empirically that perceptual
control over privacy can affect responsiveness to advertising in addition to social and personal
interactions.
The paper also contributes to the online advertising literature that has studied targeting in data-
rich social media sites. This is important because social networking websites now account for
one-third of all online display advertising [27]. However, social networking websites have pre-
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viously been perceived as being problematic venues for advertising because of extremely low
click-through rates [21]. This paper suggests that if such sites are successful at reassuring con-
sumers that they are in control of their privacy, firms can use personalization of ads to generate
higher click-through rates. Previous studies in marketing about social networking have looked at
how offline social networks can be used to target [26], how such social networking sites can use
advertising to obtain members [39], how social networks can be used to target ads [41], and also
how makers of applications designed to be used on social networking sites can best advertise their




The nonprofit running the experiment provides educational scholarships in East Africa that enable
bright girls from poor families to go to or stay in high school. Part of the nonprofit’s mission
involves explaining its work in Africa to US residents and also engaging their enthusiasm and
support for its programs. In order to do this, the nonprofit set up a Facebook ‘page’ that explained
its mission and allowed people who were interested to see photos, read stories and watch videos
about the girls who had been helped by the program.
To attract people to become fans of its Facebook page, the nonprofit started advertising using
Facebook’s own advertising platform. Initially, it ran an untargeted ad campaign which displayed
an ad in April 2010 to all users of Facebook that live in the US and are 18 years and older. This
campaign experienced a very low click-through rate and attracted fewer than five new ‘fans’ to the
website. The disappointing nature of this campaign led the nonprofit to determine whether it could
engage further with its potential supporters by both targeting and personalizing ad content.
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1.2 Randomized Campaign
The nonprofit decided to target both graduates from 20 liberal arts colleges with a reputation for
supporting female education and Facebook users who had expressed affinity with 19 celebrities and
writers who in the past had made statements supporting the education of girls in Africa or African
female empowerment in general. The nonprofit is eager to protect the privacy of its supporters, and
consequently has asked the authors to not reveal the names of either the actual celebrities or the
schools that were used in this advertising campaign. Examples could be Oprah Winfrey, who has
set up a girls’ school in South Africa, or Serena Williams, who was a supporter of ‘Build African
Schools.’ Data from Facebook advertising interface suggests there was very little overlap in fans
across these different groups.
In order to establish whether Facebook user data should be used merely to target ads, or should
in addition be used to personalize the content of the advertising message, they decided to exper-
iment with two different ad formats. Table 1 summarizes the different conditions used. In the
targeted and personalized condition, the ad explicitly mentioned the undergraduate institution or
the celebrity’s name. In the targeted but non-personalized case, the ad was similar in content but
did not explicitly mention the undergraduate institution or the celebrity’s name that had been used
to target the ad. In both cases, the baseline or ‘non-personalized’ message was not completely
generic, but instead alluded to a broad user characteristic. Therefore, the estimates reflect the in-
cremental benefit of personalized ad-content that has specific and concrete personal information
relative to ad content that uses non-specific and non-concrete information. In each case, the ad
was accompanied by the same picture of a girl who had been helped by the program. Based on the
work of (author?) [34], this girl had a sad expression.
[Table 1 about here.]
The nonprofit also continued to use as its baseline an untargeted campaign that reached out
to all adult US Facebook users simultaneously. This provided an additional baseline control for
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advertising effectiveness over the course of the study. The text of this baseline and untargeted ad
read “Support [Charity Name]. Help girls in East Africa change their lives through education.”
All campaigns were restricted to Facebook users who live in the US, and were 18 years and older
who were not already fans of the nonprofit. The nonprofit set a daily maximum spending cap on
advertising campaigns. It also agreed to pay at most $.50 for each click produced by the different
advertising campaigns.
1.3 The Introduction of Improved Privacy Controls
What was unique and potentially valuable about this field experiment was that on May 24, 2010
(after the field experiment was planned and initiated and the first data collected), Mark Zuckerberg,
the CEO of Facebook, announced that the company would be simplifying and clarifying its privacy
settings as well as rolling back some previous changes that had made Facebook users’ information
more public. Studying this change was not the purpose of the randomized field experiment, but it
presents a unique opportunity to study how a change in user privacy controls in social networking
sites could change consumer responses to advertising, since the nonprofit tested the ads using the
same randomization technique before and after the change in the privacy-control interface.
Facebook introduced this improved privacy interface after being heavily criticized because its
privacy settings were very granular and difficult to access. For example, (author?) [6] pointed out
in the national press that the 5,850 words of Facebook’s privacy policy were longer than the United
States Constitution, and that users wanting to manage their privacy settings had to navigate through
50 settings with more than 170 options. As detailed in Table A-3, Facebook had previously acted to
reduce the amount of control users had over their data and had attracted negative publicity for doing
so. In December 2009, ten privacy groups filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission2
over changes to Facebook’s privacy policy, which included default settings that made users’ status
updates available potentially to all Internet users, as well as making users’ friend lists publicly
available.
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There were three major components to Facebook’s change in privacy interface. The first was
that all privacy settings were aggregated into one simple control. Users no longer had to deal with
170 granular options. As depicted in appendix Figure A-1, this interface was far more approach-
able and easily adjustable than before. Second, Facebook no longer required users’ friends and
connections to be visible to everyone. Third, Facebook made it easier to opt out with a single click
from third-party applications from accessing users’ personal information. Generally, these changes
were received favorably. For example, the chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union, Chris
Conley, wrote, ‘The addition of simplified options (combined with the continued ability to fine-
tune your settings if you wish) and user control over Facebook’s ‘connections’ are significant
improvements to Facebook’s privacy.’
This change in privacy settings did not change how the banner ads that were served on Face-
book were targeted, or whether advertisers could use user information to personalize ads. Display
advertising was treated separately because, as Facebook states, ‘Facebook’s ad targeting is done
entirely anonymously. If advertisers select demographic targeting for their ads, Facebook auto-
matically matches those ads to the appropriate audience. Advertisers only receive anonymous data
reports.’ To reassure advertisers that the change would not adversely affect them, Facebook sent
out an email to its advertisers saying that ‘this change will not affect your advertising campaigns’
(The full letter is reproduced in the appendix.) This means that though users were given control
over how much information was being shared publicly and the extent to which they were being
tracked by third parties, the actual mechanism by which the ads tested were targeted and served
did not change.
One consequence of studying a real-life firm shift in privacy policy is that, unlike with a lab
experiment, many things were changed at once. Therefore, ultimately the measured effect is a
combination of different privacy measures, as well as how they were reported and received in the
press. Indeed, the estimate captures, besides an increased sense of control, other positive effects of
Facebook’s improved privacy policy, such as higher trust in the firm. Since these improvements in
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general perceptions may attend any firm’s improvement of privacy policies in response to privacy
critiques, this still makes the policy estimates of managerial interest.
1.4 Data
The nonprofit shared daily data from Facebook on how well each of the ads performed for the
duration of the experiment. For each of the 79 different ad campaigns, there was daily data on the
number of times they were shown and the number of clicks they received. In total these ads were
shown to 1.2 million users and received 1,995 clicks. The nonprofit was not informed by Facebook
whether they appeared on mobile devices or in the newsfeed, but it believes that at the time the
majority of ads on Facebook were shown on the right-hand-side of the screen. When a user clicked
on the ad, they were taken to the nonprofit’s Facebook page. The data spanned 2.5 weeks on either
side of the introduction of privacy controls on May 28, 2010.
This data included the number of unique impressions (that is, the number of users the ad was
shown to) and the number of clicks each ad received. Each of these clicks came from a unique
user. It contains information on the date that click was received, but not the time. It also includes
data on the cost to the nonprofit per click and the imputed cost per thousand impressions. ‘Ad-
reach’ measures the number of Facebook users who were eligible to be shown the ad for any
targeted ad campaign. This ad-reach data allows exploration in subsequent regressions of the the
behavioral mechanism. To protect the privacy of the nonprofit’s supporters, the data did not contain
information about the backgrounds or identities of those who chose to like it, or on any of their
actions after they made that choice.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics. The average number of clicks relative to ad impressions
is small, at two-tenths of one percentage point. The maximum click-through rate is 3 percent-
age points. This average is even smaller when looking at the daily level, since many campaigns
received no clicks on a given day, inflating the appearance of low click-through rates. However,
this is similar to rates reported by other advertisers for Facebook ads. In their provocatively-titled
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piece ‘Facebook Ad Click-Through Rates Are Really Pitiful,’ (author?) [4] reported average click-
through rates between .01% and .06%.
Table 2 also reports summary statistics for the data used as controls for user exposure to news
about Facebook and privacy. The first is data from Factiva about the number of newspapers that
had stories that contained the words ‘privacy’ and ‘Facebook’ and how many words each article
had that was devoted to the topic. There was also data on whether the news article appeared in a
renowned newspaper. The second is data from Google Trends that gives an index for the number of
searches for Facebook and privacy. This index lies between 0-100 and captures the relative volume
of searches over time for particular search terms for people who use the Google search engine in
the US.
[Table 2 about here.]
2 Analysis
Figure 1 displays the average click-through rate for each campaign before and after the introduc-
tion of improved privacy controls. Before the policy change, the personalized ads were under-
performing relative to their generic counterparts. This is surprising, given the expectation that
displaying personalized ad text would increase their relevance and consequently their appeal. How-
ever, after the policy change the more expected pattern prevails where ads with personalized con-
tent were relatively more effective than generically worded but targeted ads or untargeted ads. This
change was highly significant (p-value=0.0047). The effects of targeting ads without personalizing
their content before and after the introduction of improved privacy controls were not significantly
different (p-value=0.407). There appears to be little change in the effectiveness of the untargeted
campaign, though of course with only one campaign it is impossible to assess statistical signif-
icance when simply comparing a single before and after period. Analysis of click-through rates
at the daily level suggests that there was no statistically significant change in the effectiveness for
untargeted ads after the introduction of improved privacy controls.
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[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 2 examines whether there were any differences for the campaigns targeted to undergrad-
uate institutions and celebrities. It is evident that on average the celebrity-focused campaign was
more successful at attracting clicks. However, it appears clear that there was a similar incremental
jump in the effectiveness of personalized ads after the introduction of improved privacy controls
for both categories of Facebook users: Those with affinities for different schools, and those with
affinities for different celebrities.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 1 suggests that the personalization of display ads was more effective after Facebook
facilitated users’ taking control of their personal information. Regression analysis, however, allows
both an assessment of statistical significance and the use of more controls.
In the regression, the click-through rate ClickRatejt for ad j on day t targeted at group k is a
function of:
ClickRatejt = βPersonalizedj × PostPolicyt + αPersonalizedj (1)
+θ1MediaAttentiont × Personalizedj
+γk + δt + j
Personalizedj is an indicator variable equal to one if the ad contained personalized content
that reflected the data on celebrity affinity or undergraduate school used to target, and zero if there
was no personalized content. PostPolicyt is an indicator variable equal to one if the date was
after the privacy-settings policy change took place, and zero otherwise. The coefficient β captures
the effect of their interaction. θ captures the effect of various controls that allow the effectiveness
of personalized advertising to vary with media attention. γk is a vector of 39 fixed effects for the
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20 different undergraduate institutions and each of the 19 celebrities targeted. These control for
underlying systematic differences in how likely people within that target segment were to respond
to this charity. The specification includes a vector of date dummies δt. These are collinear with
PostPolicyt, which means that PostPolicyt is dropped from the specification as are the vector of
controls for the direct effect of the media MediaAttention. Because the ads are randomized, δt
and γk should primarily improve efficiency. The specification is estimated using Ordinary Least
Squares. Following the strategy presented by (author?) [5], standard errors are clustered at the
ad-campaign level to avoid artificially understating the size of the standard errors due to use of
repeated panel data.
Table 3 presents empirical estimates that incrementally build up to the full specification in
equation (1). Column (1) is an initial simplified specification. The crucial coefficient of interest
is Personalized × PostPolicy. This captures how an individual exposed to a personalized ad
responds differently to a personalized ad after Facebook’s change in privacy policy, relative to an ad
shown to the same people that had generic wording. It suggests a positive and significant increase
in the performance of personalized ads relative to merely targeted ads after the introduction of
enhanced user privacy controls. The magnitude of the estimates suggest that the click-through
rate increased by .024, relative to an average baseline click-through rate of .023 for personalized
ads before the introduction of improved privacy controls. The negative coefficient Personalized,
which is marginally significant, suggests that prior to the change in privacy settings, personalized
ads were less effective than ads that did not use personalized ad copy.3
Column (2) adds an additional interaction which controls for how many news stories there
were that day that contained the words ‘Facebook’ and ‘Privacy’. Of course, while news stories
capture some of the idea of general salience, they do not necessary reflect the extent to which news
about Facebook and privacy concerns were being processed and acted on by Facebook users. To
capture this, the analysis expands to include an additional control that captures the number of daily
searches using the terms ‘Facebook’ and ‘Privacy’ on Google as reported by the ‘Google Trends’
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index, which is reported on a scale between 0 and 100. In line with the idea that the results reported
in Column (1) were larger because of the media buzz surrounding the introduction of improved
privacy controls, the key interaction between Personalized×PostPolicy is smaller in magnitude,
though still statistically significant. Column (3) reports results from the main specification which,
combines both of these controls as summarized by equation (1). Though the estimated effect
for Personalized × PostPolicy is smaller at 0.0174, it is still a significant increase relative to
the average baseline click-through rate for personalized ads before the introduction of improved
privacy controls of 0.007.
[Table 3 about here.]
The remainder of the results reported in the table, investigate alternative ways of controlling for
media coverage. Column (4) reports the results of a specification that allows for an additional day-
delay lag in the effect of media stories appearing and Column (5) reports results of a specification
allows a lag both for the effect of stories from the previous day, and the day prior to that. This
is motivated by work by (author?) [33], who examine how there are often delays in affective
response to policy news - in their case, the advent of mad cow disease. In both cases these lags
enhance the precision and increase the size of the estimates. It is noticeable that the effect of the
second lag is significant and negative in Column (5), suggesting that there was a general negative
effect on clicking behavior from Facebook media coverage two days prior to the user being on
Facebook and seeing the ad. Very speculatively, one explanation may be that the effect of critical
media is augmented when there is multi-day coverage.
Column (6) reports a specification that uses data from Factiva that allows us to distinguish
between news stories that were reported in the major press and the specialized press and allow
the effect to vary with these different types of media. Column (7) reports a specification that uses
a word-weighted measure for these controls, to reflect the extent of coverage rather than just the
presence of coverage. Specifically, this measure weights the effect of each article by how many
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words it contains. This allows the effect of an article which was longer and took up more page
space to be more profound, than a brief or paragraph- long article. Both of these alternative ways
of specifying media presence produce a similarly sized estimate to that of the main specification
in Column (3). In general, the results of Columns (4)-(7) are reassuring that the measured effect
of the introduction of privacy controls is robust to different ways of controlling for the extensive
media coverage.
There is a relatively low R2 across all specifications. This low level of explanatory power is
shared by much of the online advertising literature [31, 17]. One possible explanation is that con-
sumers are skilled at avoiding looking at online advertising when viewing webpages, introducing
measurement error [13] and requiring researchers to assemble large datasets to measure effects
precisely. In addition, this is simply the average effects of the policy - there may have been many
Facebook users for whom the policy had essentially no effect as they had no intention of ever
clicking on ads.
This empirical analysis uses a short time window of five weeks. This means it is less likely
that there is some long-run trend, for example increasing user acceptance of ad personalization or
‘habituation’ to privacy concerns, that drives the results. To show robustness to an even shorter
window, Column (1) reports estimates exclusively for 10 days from Day 13 to Day 22 (five days
before and five days after) around the introduction of improved privacy controls. The results for a
specification with no controls, reported in Column (1) of Table 4, were positive but larger than for
the full period. Examining similar ten-day windows in the pre-policy change period exhibited no
evidence of any significant change in preferences for personalized advertising. One explanation is
that the introduction of improved privacy controls was particularly salient in this 10-day window
due to the amount of media coverage, meaning that people were more sensitized to personalized
advertising. Column (2) explores this by including controls from the main specification in Column
(3) of Table 3 for news stories and general ‘buzz’ about the introduction of improved privacy
controls. The results are also robust to excluding the period where the service was rolled out and
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the days spanning announcement and implementation. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 examine the
effect of excluding the immediate ten-day window around the policy change. Similarly, Columns
(5) and (6) examine the effect of using a window that excludes the immediate 20 days around
the policy change. The results are reasonably similar, though the news controls generally appear
to increase the precision of the estimates for these windows outside the immediate time of the
policy change. Another noticeable pattern is that the point estimates are largest for the 10-day
window immediately surrounding the period. One explanation for this could be that users were
more likely to recall or remember the change in privacy settings close to the time the policy change
occurred. However, this is speculation based on the relative size of point estimates - a combined
regression suggests that there is no statistically significant difference in the size of the estimated
point estimates.
[Table 4 about here.]
With any research that relies on a natural experiment for identification, there are open questions
about what precisely is the local average treatment effect that is being estimated. The estimates
include controls for the direct effect of media - if the media is telling users that Facebook is bad
and intrusive, they may be less likely to click on personalized ads, regardless of whether or not
Facebook has privacy controls in place. The media controls (in particular the lags) should help
control for this. What the media controls cannot do, however, is control for the fact that as a result
of the media publicity, many Facebook users were aware of the change in policy. This means that
the correct interpretation of what is measured is that these estimates apply to a large firm that is
under media scrutiny for its privacy policies and consequently can rely on the fact that its users
found out about changes in its privacy policy. These estimates may be less applicable to small
firms who cannot rely on the media to highlight changes in their privacy policy and controls for
them.
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2.1 Further Robustness Checks
The assumption that allows us to ascribe causality to the estimates is that there was no change
in Facebook user and advertiser behavior and the external environment that drove the results that
was not associated with the change in privacy controls.4 This section uses further external data to
provide evidence surrounding this assumption.
An obvious concern is that though there could be an increase in the proportion of clicks for an
ad, this increase might not have been helpful for the marketing aims of the nonprofit. For example,
an alternative explanation for the results is that after the introduction of improved privacy controls,
consumers became more likely to click on an ad that appeared too intrusive, in order to find out
what data the advertiser had or because they were curious as to how they obtained their data, rather
than it being the case they were more likely to respond positively to the advertising message.
The nonprofit shared weekly update emails from Facebook that recorded how many people had
become their ‘fan’ on Facebook and subscribed to their newsfeed, to help rule out this alternative
explanation. In the two weeks prior to the introduction of improved privacy controls, there was
a 0.97 correlation between the number of fans and number of clicks. After the introduction of
improved privacy controls, there was a 0.96 correlation between the number of fans and number of
clicks. There was no statistically significant difference between these two correlations, suggesting
that it was not the case that after the introduction of improved privacy controls people were more
likely to click on the ad even if they had no interest in the work of the nonprofit. In general, the
nonprofit considers the campaign to have been a success, especially given the relatively small cost
of the trial (less than $1,000). In their most recent fundraising campaign, around six percent of
revenues from new donors came directly from their Facebook page.
One potential concern is that the results reflect a change in the number of Facebook users. For
example, the negative publicity could have driven more experienced users away, leaving only users
who were likely to react to personalized advertising using Facebook. According to the figures
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on the advertising ‘reach’ made available to advertisers by Facebook, the potential audience did
not decrease for any of the ads following the policy change, instead showing only a very small
increase. In Table A-4 in the appendix, comScore data based on their panel of two million internet
users suggests that this was not the case, and that there was actually an increase in the number
of users. There were only small changes in the composition of the user base in June relative to
May, and the shifts did not seem to be more dramatic than the shifts seen from April to May. The
(author?) [20] test allows testing for outliers in the full year of data, with the caveat that there is
a limited number of observations. The results of this test did not indicate that observed changes
between May and June deviated from the expected normal distribution.
Though observed demographics were reasonably similar, there is always the possibility that the
composition of Facebook users changed in an unobserved way and that this influenced which ads
were shown in the period after the introduction of privacy controls. For example, there could have
been more fans of a celebrity who was famous for directly reaching out to the public and whose
fans consequently were more likely to have a taste for personalization using Facebook after the
introduction of improved privacy controls. Empirically, the mix of ads displayed did not change
over time. If the composition of ads did change, then this could be a response to the fact that more
consumers of that type were going online or, alternatively, that the same number of consumers
were spending longer online. Table A-6 in the appendix reports the results and shows that there
was no change in which ads were shown based on their observable characteristics, though there
may of course have been unobserved changes based on their unobserved characteristics.
It is also possible that, rather than a change in user composition, the measured effect could
have been driven by a dramatic change in how people use Facebook. For example, an alternative
explanation of the results could be that after the introduction of improved privacy controls, people
were more likely to spend time on Facebook and consequently more likely to eventually click
on a personalized ad, perhaps because they mistook it for non-commercial content. Table A-5 in
the appendix presents data from Compete, Inc., about how users’ browsing behavior on Facebook
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changed over 2010. There does not appear to be any large or dramatic change in users’ browsing
behavior in the period studied, compared to the natural fluctuations that are apparent for the rest
of the year. Again, the (author?) [20] test for outliers indicated that the post-policy period did not
deviate from the expected normal distribution.
Another concern is that the results could reflect a change in the composition of advertisers.
For example, perhaps other advertisers pulled out of Facebook as a result of the negative publicity
concerning the privacy interface, meaning that perhaps there were fewer advertisers competing to
personalize advertising, which made the personalized ads relatively more attractive. Though not a
direct test, there is evidence against this interpretation in the pricing data for the ads. If there had
been a drop-off in advertisers, this should have translated to a decrease in the price paid in the ad
auction, as the price should theoretically be a function of the number of bidders [28]. However, the
small drop in cost per click of 1.5 cents (3%) after the introduction of improved privacy controls
was not statistically significant (p-value=0.59).
2.2 Mechanism: Rarity of User Information
(author?) [14, 43] have shown that personalized ads can lead to a process of ‘reactance’ [8], where
consumers deliberately resist ads that they perceive as intrusive. A potential explanation for why
addressing privacy concerns by improving privacy controls was associated with improved adver-
tising performance is that it reduced consumers’ level of reactance to personalized advertising.
To provide evidence for this proposed mechanism, this analysis exploits the fact that earlier
studies have shown that reactance to personalized advertising is larger for ads that use more unique
information about the consumer [43]. For example, if an ad were personalized around the fact that
a Facebook user liked ‘cooking,’ then Facebook has 3,167,540 users who say on their profiles that
they like cooking. The use of such information might be felt to be less intrusive and consequently
less likely to invoke reactance. However, if an ad were personalized around the fact that a user
liked the Korean delicacy kimchi, then there are only 6,180 Facebook users who say that they like
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kimchi; knowing that such a preference is relatively rare might make the user more concerned they
were being tracked by the advertiser in a privacy-violating manner, increasing intrusiveness and
consequently provoking reactance.
To explore this in this empirical setting, the analysis employes additional data on how many
users were in the target group for that particular campaign. Equation (1) is expanded so that the
click-through rate ClickRatejt for ad j on day t targeted at group k is now a function of:
ClickRatejt = β1Personalizedj × PostPolicyt × AdReachk + (2)
β2Personalizedj × PostPolicyt + β3PostPolicyt × AdReachk +
α1Personalizedj + α2Personalizedj × AdReachk
θMediaAttentiont × Personalizedj + γk + δt + j
AdReachk, MediaAttentiont and Postpolicyt are collinear with the date and campaign fixed
effects, so are dropped from the equation.
Table 5 uses equation (3) to investigate how the estimates were moderated by how large or
small the reach of the ad was - how many people, potentially, the ad could be shown to. Column
(1) of Table 5 reports how the efficacy of personalized ads relative to ads that were targeted to
users’ interests before and after the introduction of improved privacy controls was affected by
ad-reach for the initial specification. The negative coefficient on PostPolicy × Personalized × Ad-
Reach suggests that the positive effect is smaller for ads that had a larger ad-reach than those that
had a smaller ad-reach. In other words, personalization was relatively more successful after the
introduction of privacy controls for celebrities who had smaller fan bases or schools with smaller
numbers of graduates on Facebook, as can be seen from the larger point estimate for PostPolicy ×
Personalized relative to Table 3, Column (1).
Columns (2)-(6) of Table 5 echo the earlier analysis in Columns (3)-(7) of Table 3 by adding
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incremental controls for different types of media attention. The result remains robust to these dif-
ferent controls. Ad-Reach is denominated in millions of users. Therefore, roughly extrapolating
from the linear functional form, the estimates suggest that for ads for the campaigns in the sample
that have target audiences of greater than 243,000, the effect of the policy was canceled out. How-
ever, for the median campaign, which had 7,560 people in the target market, the introduction of
privacy controls actually raised the click-through percentage by 0.03.
[Table 5 about here.]
2.3 The Role of Privacy Settings Usage
These results are reasonably compelling that the result is driven by the rarity of information used
which in turn should be linked to privacy concerns. However, it is still is only indirectly linked
to privacy controls. Though Facebook did not share information about whether users did indeed
change their privacy settings using the newly introduced controls, the nonprofit did give data on
average usage of alternative privacy controls by different groups of Facebook users, allowing ex-
amination of whether the effect was indeed strongest for users who are most likely to use privacy
controls.
It is not clear whether the effect will be largest for users who care about privacy controls. It may
be that consumers who care about privacy would be most upset if they set highly protective privacy
settings and still see highly personalized advertising. On the other hand, such consumers who are
more aware of privacy matters on Facebook may have experienced the most reactance prior to
Facebook addressing privacy complaints with the improved set of privacy policies. They may have
also been the most reassured that they could now explicitly prevent Facebook from sharing their
click data with third parties.
Specifically, this new analysis exploits the fact that after the events studied in this paper, Face-
book introduced a new product called ‘social advertising’. This new form of advertising is de-
scribed in detail in (author?) [41]. These are ads which feature the name of friends who have
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‘liked’ a webpage. Facebook users can use the Facebook privacy controls to prevent their name
being featured in these ads to their friends who may be targeted by a firm. This percentage of ‘opt-
outs’ is shared with the advertising firm. Therefore, two years after the original data was collected,
the nonprofit briefly (at the author’s request) ran new social ad campaigns that were targeted at
each of the 39 original target groups. This allowed a measure for for each of these target groups
on what proportion of ads shown to the target Facebook users had the friend’s name and image
removed.
There are two obvious assumptions underlying this measure. The first is that because this ad
product and data did not exist at the time of the natural experiment, this procedure assumes that a
taste for using privacy controls remains static in the target groups over time, or at least that if there
was a change, that all target groups changed at the same rate. This is based on empirical evidence
that suggests that though the absolute level of privacy taste can change, the rate of change across
demographic groups does not differ [18].
The second assumption is that a taste for privacy controls among the friends of people who
are in the target group reflects the taste for privacy controls of the members of the target group
themselves. The advertising data is constructed so that a firm can only ever observe usage of
privacy controls by the friends of any target group it selects, not the target group itself. Therefore,
there is an implicit assumption that there is a correlation across friends in terms of tastes for the use
of privacy controls. Such homophily or correlations across friends in tastes for privacy has been
documented in field data from online social networks by (author?) [1, 23].
On average, 14.9% of the ad impressions were affected by Facebook users opting-out of show-
ing their name and photo. There was considerable variation in this statistic across the 39 target
groups, varying from 56% to 0%.
Including this measure of privacy control use, modifies equation (1) for the click-through rate
ClickRatejt for ad j on day t targeted at group k in the following manner:
22
ClickRatejt = β1Personalizedj × PostPolicyt × PrivacyControlsUsek + (3)
β2Personalizedj × PostPolicyt + β3PostPolicyt × PrivacyControlsUsek +
α1Personalizedj + α2Personalizedj × PrivacyControlsUsek
θMediaAttentiont × Personalizedj + γk + δt + j
The results are reported in Table 6. It is important to emphasize that these results pool data
collected two years after the date of the original data with the original data to construct the in-
teraction variable PrivacyControlsUsek. The estimates for Personalizedj × PostPolicyt ×
PrivacyControlsUsek are reasonably consistent across the different specifications that allow for
different media controls. In each case they suggest that as more people in the group targeted use
privacy controls, the larger is the effect of introducing privacy controls.
That the usage of privacy controls across the different groups targeted by the firms mediates the
effect size is further evidence that the increase in personalized advertising effectiveness observed
in Figure 1 was driven by customers’ affinity for privacy controls, rather than by media coverage














This paper explores the consequences for data-rich websites, such as social networks, that try to
support themselves through advertising, of addressing privacy concerns by offering users more
control over their privacy. The paper uses data from a randomized experiment conducted by a
nonprofit that was designed to explore the relative merits of targeted ads with generic text, and
ads that used user information to personalize the content of the ad. During the field experiment,
the social networking site on which the experiment was being conducted unexpectedly announced
that it would change the interface through which users controlled their privacy settings. These
changes, which were publicly applauded by consumer advocates, gave users greater control over
what personally identifiable information was shared and whether third parties could track their
movements. However, advertisers could still use the same personal data to target and personalize
advertising messages with before and after the policy change.
Recent research [15] has emphasized that to succeed in the new world of social media, brands
must relinquish control. This research parallels such findings by emphasizing that to succeed, web
platforms need to give control over privacy settings to their users if they want to use user data to
enhance their offerings.
Empirical analysis suggests that after this change in policy, Facebook users were nearly twice
as likely to react positively to personalized ad content and click on personalized ads. There was
generally no economically significant change in their reactions to untargeted or merely targeted
ads. This suggests that publicly giving users control over their private information can benefit
advertising-supported media and advertisers on social-networking sites. This has important con-
sequences for the current policy debate, which views the introduction of privacy controls as being
harmful to advertising outcomes [19].
There are limitations to this research. First, the randomized experiment was conducted by an
nonprofit with an appealing cause. Consumers may be ready to ascribe less pernicious motives to
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an nonprofit than to a for-profit company when they observe their advertising. Second, this ran-
domized experiment was conducted at a time when privacy concerns were particularly sensitive
and salient in consumers’ eyes. Though, the analysis deploys controls for the extent of the pub-
licity surrounding privacy and Facebook, it is not clear how the results would change when the
introduction of controls is not so heavily publicized by the media. Third, the analysis focuses on a
particular platform with a specific business model and community of users and the results cannot
be extrapolated more generally to other websites or situations without further analysis. Fourth, it is
not clear how long the measured positive effects persisted after the introduction of privacy controls
for personalized advertising. Fifth, it is difficult to project general economic effects of such policy
change without more information on the penetration of personalized advertising on platforms like
Facebook. Last, the type of privacy control introduced by Facebook was just one of a myriad of
potential ways that social networks or other advertising-supported websites could have used to give
control over their privacy settings to their users. Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper does
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Notes
1There is some evidence, however, that such individual-controls imposed costs on the systems considering adopting
the privacy controls [29, 10]
2http://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/EPIC-FacebookComplaint.pdf.
3Earlier versions of this paper demonstrated robustness to a logit model. Since this was achieved by simply con-
verting the aggregate-level data to be on the individual level, the results were similar.
4The online web appendix replicates the natural experiment by using data from an online survey that tested con-
sumer reactions to different online ads. These ads displayed either unique or not-at-all-unique private information that
the same consumer had supplied earlier, in contexts where respondents either felt they had control over their personal
information or that they did not. The results from this experiment confirm the earlier findings and, by explicitly mea-
suring stated reactance, provide support for a behavioral mechanism where reactance is reduced for highly personal
advertising if consumers perceive they have control over their privacy.
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Figure 1: Comparison in Click-Through Rates Before and After
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Figure 2: Comparison in Click-Through Rates Before and After
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Table 1: Campaign appeals in different conditions
Information used to target ad College Interest
Targeted and Personalized As a [undergraduate institution name] gradu-
ate you had the benefit of a great education.
Help girls in East Africa change their lives
through education.
As a fan of [name of celebrity] you know
that strong women matter. Help girls in East
Africa change their lives through education.
Targeted and Non-Personalized You had the benefit of a great education. Help
girls in East Africa change their lives through
education.
You know that strong women matter. Help
girls in East Africa change their lives through
education.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Average Impressions 15694.0 47807.1 337 376528
Average Click-Through (Percentage Points) 0.023 0.14 0 3.13
Ad-Reach (000) 95 210 9,800 990,000
Average Cost Per Click 0.38 0.095 0.11 0.50
Cost per 1000 views 0.095 0.11 0 0.39
News Article containing ‘Facebook’ & ‘Privacy’ 61.1 39.7 10 210
Major Newspaper Articles containing ‘Facebook’ & ‘Privacy’ 3.24 1.54 1 7
Google Searches 75.7 7.46 62 91
Words Devoted to News 37887 39559 1160 152240
Campaign-level data. 79 Different Campaigns (78 campaigns based on 39 different target groups
each with personalized and targeted variants. 1 untargeted campaign). Table A-1 in the appendix































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Looking at different time windows
10 Day Excluding 10 Day Excluding 20 Day
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Personalized × PostPolicy 0.0554∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗ 0.0149∗∗ 0.0161∗∗ 0.0235∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0229) (0.00711) (0.00786) (0.0105) (0.00723)
Personalized -0.0112 0.0106 -0.0141∗∗∗ 0.286 -0.00528∗∗ 0.0248
(0.0115) (0.0404) (0.00464) (0.312) (0.00248) (0.0355)
Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targeting Variable Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
News+Search Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 780 780 1872 1872 1326 1326
R2 0.118 0.119 0.044 0.043 0.052 0.045
OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click-through rate for each of 79 campaigns.
Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. PostPolicyt is collinear




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Mechanism: Role of privacy setting Usage
No Controls Controls Lags Lags 2 Specializedvs. Main
Word-
Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Personalized × Postpolicy × PrivacyControlUse 0.0942∗∗ 0.0942∗∗ 0.0942∗∗ 0.0942∗∗ 0.0942∗∗ 0.0942∗∗
(0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0419)
Personalized × PostPolicy 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0331∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0300∗∗ 0.0308∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0128)
Personalized -0.0119∗ 0.339 0.309 0.297 0.106 0.133
(0.00627) (0.266) (0.268) (0.267) (0.250) (0.266)
Postpolicy × PrivacyControlUse 0.00394 0.00394 0.00394 0.00394 0.00394 0.00394
(0.0398) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0397)
Personalized Ad × News Articles 0.0510∗∗∗ 0.0644∗ 0.0660∗
(0.0191) (0.0341) (0.0341)
Personalized Ad × Google Searches -0.139∗∗ -0.139∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.0200 -0.0260
(0.0619) (0.0620) (0.0615) (0.0588) (0.0606)
Personalized Ad × News Articles (Lag) -0.0102 0.0158
(0.0206) (0.0236)
Personalized Ad × News Articles (Lag 2) -0.0305∗
(0.0175)
Personalized Ad × Major Newspapers -0.00278
(0.00954)
Personalized Ad × Specialized News -0.0124∗
(0.00662)
Personalized Ad × Major Newspapers (Lag) 0.00420
(0.00781)
Personalized Ad × Specialized News (Lag) -0.00312
(0.00918)
Personalized Ad× Major News (words) -0.00153
(0.00282)
Personalized Ad × Specialized News (words) -0.00238
(0.00186)
Date Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Targeted Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2730 2730 2730 2730 2730 2730
R2 0.061 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.061
OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click-through rate for each of 79 campaigns.
Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
PostPolicyt is collinear with the date fixed effects and dropped from the specification. PrivacyControlUse is collinear with the fixed effects
for the group targeted and also dropped from the specification.
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A Data Appendix
Table A-1: Sources of data used in the study
Data Variable Data Source
Impressions Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Clicks Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Ad-Reach (000000) Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Average Cost Per Click Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Cost per 1000 views Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Daily volume of News Articles mentioning Facebook and Privacy Factiva Database: http://global.factiva.com
Daily volume of Words Devoted to News Factiva Database: http://global.factiva.com
Google Searches using Facebook and Privacy Google Trends www.google.com/trends/
Facebook users in that interest-group using privacy controls for social advertising Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit 2-years after
the initial field test
Table A-2: Top 10 U.S. online display ad publishers Q3 2010
Website Display Ad Impressions (MM) Share of Display Ad Impressions
Facebook.com 297,046 23.1
Yahoo! Sites 140,949 11.0
Microsoft Sites 64,009 5.0
Fox Interactive Media 48,252 3.8
Google Sites 35,043 2.7
AOL, Inc. 32,330 2.5
Turner Network 21,268 1.7
Glam Media 13,274 1.0
eBay 8,421 0.7
ESPN 8,261 0.6
Source: comScore Ad Metrix. Display ads include static and rich media ads.
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Table A-3: Timeline for Facebook growth, privacy and advertising
Date Event
February 2004 Facebook launched from Harvard dorm room.
November 2007 Facebook launches ‘Facebook ads’. Advertising pilot involving ‘beacons’ (small 1x1 pixel web bugs) allows
Facebook to track users’ movements over other websites for purposes of targeting.
December 2007 Facebook makes Beacon an opt-out service after negative publicity.
September 2009 Beacon ad targeting program shut down amid class-action suit.
November 2009 Facebook changes its default settings to publicly reveal more of its users’ information that had previously only
been available to Facebook users. This information could now be tracked by third-party search engines.
December 9 2009 Privacy settings are entirely removed from certain categories of users’ information. These categories include the
user’s name, profile photo, list of friends and pages they were a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks
the user was connected to. They are instead labeled as publicly available to everyone, and can only be partially
controlled by limiting search privacy settings. Founder Mark Zuckerberg’s photos are apparently inadvertently
made public by the change in settings.
December 17 2009 Coalition of privacy groups led by the Electronic Frontier Foundation files a complaint with Federal Trade Com-
mission over changes to privacy settings
April 2010 Facebook users’ General Information becomes publicly exposed whenever they connect to certain applications or
websites such as the online review site Yelp. General Information includes users’ name and their friends’ names,
profile pictures, gender, user IDs, connections, and any content shared using the Everyone privacy setting.
May 12 2010 New York Times publishes article entitled ‘Facebook Privacy: A Bewildering Tangle of Options’ [6]. This ignites
a firestorm of negative press about Facebook and privacy.
Monday May 24 2010 Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg announces in an editorial in the Washington Post that Facebook will institute
new privacy settings
Wednesday May 26 2010 Facebook unveils new privacy settings in press event
Thursday May 27 2010 Facebook starts rollout of privacy settings. New York Times publishes ‘A Guide to Facebook’s New Privacy
Settings’.
Saturday May 29 2010 First reports of new privacy setting controls being seen by users
Additional Sources: Facebook’s official public timeline; ‘Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline’: Electronic Frontier Foundation April
2010.
Table A-4: There were only small changes in Facebook user composition
Proportion of Group April 2010 May 2010 June 2010
Age <17 10.4 10.6 11.4
Age 18-24 19.2 19.4 18.6
Age 25-34 20.8 20.7 20.8
Age 35-44 20.4 19.9 19.9
Age 45-54 16.7 16.5 16.5
Age 55-64 8 8.1 8.1
Age 65+ 4.6 4.8 4.7
Income <$15k 10.1 10.3 9.7
Income $15-24k 6.2 6.1 5.9
Income $25-39k 12.5 12.7 13.5
Income $40-59k 22.1 22 24.2
Income $60-74k 10.9 11.3 9.6
Income $75-99k 16.8 16.3 15.3
Income $100k+ 21.5 21.2 21.8
Male 47.2 47.1 48.2
Female 52.8 52.9 51.8
Total Unique Visitors 121 Million 130 Million 141 Million
Source: Comscore Marketer Database
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Table A-5: There was little change in how Facebook users used the website
Date Average Stay Visits / Person Pages / Visit
Dec-09 21:29 22.27 29.46
Jan-10 23:06 22.15 33.52
Feb-10 22:14 21.08 35.33
Mar-10 21:30 23.4 29:00
Apr-10 21:54 23.27 25.45
May-10 22:39 24.9 27.27
Jun-10 21:50 24.37 24.78
Jul-10 22:28 24.61 28.64
Aug-10 22:28 26.86 30.33
Sep-10 22:25 26.12 27.49
Oct-10 24:30 26.52 24.64
Nov-10 24:56 26.55 23.86
Dec-10 25:48 26.46 24.24
Source: Compete, Inc
Table A-6: Test of whether there was a change in the types of ads were being shown before and
after the introduction of improved privacy controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PostPolicy -77.71 -108.6 -17.32 26.90
(117.9) (236.1) (70.60) (163.6)
PostPolicy × School Indicator -60.14 71.91
(241.3) (170.9)
PostPolicy × Ad Reach 633.0 710.1
(923.0) (908.0)
Targeted Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2730 2730 2730 2730
R2 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.051
OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is number of times each ad is shown.
Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Ad-Reachk and School are collinear with the fixed effects for the group targeted and also dropped from
the specification.
Column (2) suggests that it was not the case that more ads associated with undergraduate institutions were
shown after the introduction of improved privacy controls. Column (3) suggests it was not the case that ads
that had a larger potential reach, for example ads associated with famous celebrities, were shown more
frequently after the introduction of improved privacy controls. Column (4) combines these two measures
and again finds no significant change after the policy in terms of what ads were shown. A specification
which interacted the 39 groups targeted with the Postpolicy indicator produced no significant interactions.
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B The change in privacy controls




A-1 Exhibit A: Facebook’s Notification to Advertisers: May 26, 2010
Facebook will roll out changes today that will make it easier for our users to understand and
control their privacy settings. As this change will have an impact on our users, we wanted to let
you, a valued advertising partner, know about it. Please note that this change will not affect your
advertising campaigns and there is no action required on your part.
Facebook is a company that moves quickly, constantly innovating and launching new products
to improve the user experience. The feedback we heard from users was that in our efforts to
innovate, some of our privacy settings had become confusing.
We believe in listening to our users and taking their feedback into account whenever possible.
We think the following changes address these concerns by providing users with more control over
their privacy settings and making them more simple to use.
Starting today, Facebook will:
* Provide an easy-to-use “master” control that enables users to set who can see the content
they share through Facebook. This enables users to choose, with just one click, the overall
privacy level they’re comfortable with for the content they share on Facebook. Of course,
users can still use all of the granular controls we’ve always offered, if they wish.
* Significantly reduce the amount of information that must be visible to everyone on Facebook.
Facebook will no longer require that users’ friends and connections are visible to everyone.
Only Name, Profile Picture, Networks and Gender must be publicly available. Users can opt
to make all other connections private.
* Make it simple to control whether other applications and websites access any user informa-
tion. While a majority of our users love Facebook apps and Facebook-enhanced websites,
some may prefer not to share their information outside of Facebook. Users can now opt out
with just one click.
45
I encourage you to take a moment to read our CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s blog post and check out the
new Facebook Privacy Page.
Thanks, The Facebook Ads Team
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